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1 Introduction
The claim that left-leaning governments are prone to decit spending is recurrent in the
political discourse. Since the start of the rst Obama administration the U.S. gross federal
debt-GDP ratio rose from 68% to 103%. Republican politicians have criticized this debt
accumulation, arguing that the administration is scally irresponsible and imposes an un-
acceptable burden on future generations. However, a longer-term perspective shows that
government debt grew during the Republican administrations of Reagan, George Bush, and
George W. Bush, while it fell during all previous Democratic presidents after World War
II.
A similar ambiguity is observed in Europe. Today, Merkels conservative German gov-
ernment is a strenuous advocate of scal discipline, whereas the left-leaning governments of
France and Italy defend more relaxed budget policies.1 Radical left-wing parties in Greece
and Spain take an even stronger stance against scal austerity. Yet, post-war European
history is full of instances in which the right has been less scally responsible than the
left. In Sweden, the debt-GDP ratio increased during the conservative governments of
Fälldin and Bildt, and was reduced by the subsequent Social-Democratic governments.2
In Italy, debt expanded rst under the centre coalition governments of the 1980s, and re-
mained thereafter high under the right-wing governments of Berlusconi, while falling during
Prodis left-leaning cabinets.
Are there systematic di¤erences between governments of di¤erent colors in the propen-
sity to issue debt? To address this question, we investigate theoretically and empirically
the politico-economic determinants of scal policy. The key assumption is preference het-
erogeneity across voters: left-wing (l-type) voters have a more intense preference for gov-
ernment expenditure and public good provision while right-wing (r-type) voters like more
the consumption of private goods. Since voters are forward-looking, left-wing voters are
more concerned with the future viability of public good provision, and prefer more scal
responsibility than do right-wing voters. We show that this simple intuition carries over
to a model of dynamic voting where stochastic exogenous shocks shift the power of the
two groups to inuence the scal policy chosen by elected governments. When left-wing
voters have a stronger political inuence, left-leaning governments cater to their concern
1Debt-nanced government expenditure is supported vigorously by left-wing movements in Southern
Europe (e.g., Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain).
2Even though the debt-GDP ratio has remained moderate during the recent centre-right cabinets led
by Reinfeldt (2006-2014), the scal decit increased in the electoral year, prompting the newly elected
socialdemocratic government led by Löfven to write prominently in its Statement of Government Policy:
"The new Government is inheriting a worrying public nance situation. Public nance decits have grown
year on year, despite the strengthening economy. These decits must gradually be driven down so that
Sweden stays within its scal policy framework."
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for future public good provision by choosing a low debt accumulation. The opposite occurs
when right-leaning governments rule. Our theory also predicts that left-leaning govern-
ments run more aggressive counter-cyclical debt policies in response to productivity shocks
even though they accumulate less debt during normal times.
We embed the political shocks in a dynamic overlapping generation model with repeated
probabilistic voting à la Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2012), henceforth SSZ. As in
SSZ, elected governments choose sequentially scal policy  labor taxation, government
expenditure on public goods, and debt policy  subject to a sequence of intertemporal
budget constraints. In SSZ, where there are no political shocks, the equilibrium scal policy
hinges on the intensity of voters preferences for public good consumption. In the current
paper, we show that this insight extends to a stochastic model with political shocks that
shift voterspreference intensity for public good provision over time. When the political
equilibrium swings to the left, the government increases taxation and public expenditure,
and reduces debt. The opposite occurs after a swing to the right. The intuition is as
follows. First, as in SSZ, the driver of scal discipline is the concern of young voters for the
ability of future governments to provide public goods. In turn, the strength of the scal
discipline imposed by the young hinges on the intensity of their taste for future public
good consumption. When left-wing voters have a stronger clout, the government increases
taxes and expenditure, and reduces debt accumulation. Conversely, when right-wing voters
are more inuential, the government chooses lower taxes and increases debt, in order to
maximize private consumption. Consider, for instance, a stark example in which (i) public
good consumption does not enter the utility function of r-type voters, and (ii) political
shocks are extreme, i.e., under a right-leaning government, young r-type voters dictate
their desired scal policy. Then, the right-leaning government would provide no public
good, push debt to its upper limit, and rebate the proceeds to private consumers. Left-
wing young voters would be hurt the most by such a starve-the-beastscal policy: on
the one hand there is no expenditure on public goods today, and on the other hand high
debt destroys the ability of the future governments to provide public goods.
In an extension, we also show that left-leaning governments are predicted to engage in
more proactive countercyclical scal policy. Intuitively, during normal times a left-leaning
government would engage in more public saving (in the form of less government debt) and
less private savings. Therefore, to smooth an income shortfall associated with a recession,
a left-leaning government does not have much choice public savings must shoulder the
brunt of the adjustment.
For ease of exposition, we rst derive our results in a small open economy with an exoge-
nous interest rate. Then, we endogenize the interest rate and characterize the stationary
equilibrium of a world comprising a continuum of small open economies, following the
3
methodology pioneered by Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). We show that a calibrated
version of the general equilibrium model is consistent with a broadly realistic cross-country
debt distribution even in the absence of any exogenous ex-ante di¤erence in preference or
technology across countries. In a special case we are able to fully characterize the equilib-
rium distribution of debt.
In the second part of the paper we show that the main predictions of the theory are con-
sistent with the time-series evidence for the U.S. for the post-war period (1950-2013). For
example, when the president in o¢ ce is a Republican the average increase in the debt-GDP
ratio is about 2 percentage points per year higher than when the president is a Democrat.
The di¤erence is statistically signicant and robust to several control variables including
a measure of business cycle activity. We also nd that Democratic administrations adopt
more aggressive countercyclical scal policies. Namely, relative to the scal policy they pur-
sue during normal times, Democrats increase the debt-GDP ratio during recessions more
than do Republican administrations. Finally, debt expansion during the Great Recession
stands out as an outlier. Yet, whether or not a dummy for the Great Recession is included,
the results are robust: ceteris paribus, Republican administrations issue more debt than
Democratic administrations. The recent behavior of the Obama administration follows the
tradition of Democratic administration to expand debt in recessions.
Qualitatively similar results obtain in a panel of OECD countries. We use the dataset of
Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) for government debt covering the period 1950-2010. We classify
governments into right-leaning, center or coalition, and left-leaning based on the Ideological
Complexion of Government and Parliament (CPG) Index of Woldendorp, Keman, and
Budge (2000, 2011). For the period 1950-2007, we nd that a shift from left to right
increases debt by 0.6 percentage points, statistically signicant at the 5% level. The point
estimate remains positive if one adds the Great Recession to the sample, although the result
becomes slightly weaker. We also nd that there is a signicant interaction e¤ect between
the color of the government and the Great Recession: in response to the crisis, left-leaning
governments have expanded debt signicantly more than have right-leaning governments.
In a specication that controls for the asymmetric behavior of governments during the Great
Recession, left-leaning governments accumulate less debt than right-leaning governments,
similar to the U.S. case. The e¤ect is statistically signicant.
In the international setting, it is more di¢ cult to pin down the political orientation of
governments, due to the presence of coalition governments whose partners may have het-
erogenous objectives. Thus, the results are likely to su¤er from some attenuation bias due
to measurement error. With this motivation, we repeat the analysis on a restricted sample
including only countries with a majoritarian electoral system for which the classication
of the political color of the government (right vs. left) is not ambiguous. The results are
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qualitatively similar to those in the full sample, but the estimated di¤erences are larger
and much more precisely estimated.
We also nd that the debt-GDP ratio is mean reverting contradicting the normative
theory of Barro (1979) that debt growth should be independent of the debt-GDP ratio and
therefore non-stationary. This conrms the results Bohn (1998) found for the US. Finally,
we also nd evidence that, conditional on the debt-GDP ratio, Democratic presidents
set higher tax rates and higher non-military government expenditure than do Republican
presidents.3 In the case of taxation, we document similar evidence in the panel of OECD
countries. This is consistent with our theoretical model presented in the rst part.
Our paper contributes to a broad literature on the politico-economic determinants of
government debt (for a recent state-of-the-art survey see Alesina and Passalacqua, 2015).
The closest related paper is Persson and Svensson (1989). They construct a two-period
model where an incumbent conservative government with a low preference for public con-
sumption expects to be replaced by a left-leaning government with a high preference for
public consumption. They investigate theoretically how the expectation of future replace-
ment a¤ects the scal policy of the current government. They show that, under some
assumptions, the conservative government chooses to strategically issue more debt when
it expects to be replaced than when it expects to remain in power in the second period.
The e¤ect of political persistence or reelection probabilities is not the focal point of our
investigation. The robust prediction of our theory (that we test empirically) is that a left-
leaning government issues less debt, irrespective of the probability of being replaced, and
in spite of the fact that the government has the same altruistic concern for future gener-
ations as has the right-leaning government. Interestingly, the question raised by Persson
and Svensson (1989) can be addressed in our dynamic model. We prove analytically that,
under logarithmic utility and inelastic labor supply, the probability that a government is
replaced by a government of an opposite color has no e¤ect on the current scal policy, due
to the cancellation of an income and a substitution e¤ect. In the more general case with
an elastic labor supply, the e¤ect of political persistence is ambiguous, but our numerical
analysis nds it to be in any case quantitatively negligible.
Other theoretical contributions emphasizing political conict as a driving factor for
public debt include Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), and more
recently, Battaglini and Coate (2008), Yared (2010), Azzimonti (2011), Battaglini (2011),
Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014), and Scholl (2015). Di¤erent from us, these papers
focus on closed economies that could not explain the cross-country distribution of gov-
3While our model abstracts from asymmetries in preference for expenditure over di¤erent public goods,
it seems natural to separate military expenditure, since in reality this type of expenditure is likely to appeal
more to right-wing than to left-wing voters.
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ernment debt. SSZ consider an integrated world economy but do not study a stochastic
environment. Bachmann and Bai (2013) and Azzimonti and Talbert (2014) analyze dy-
namic scal policy with stochastic preferences for public goods and productivity shocks,
but limit the analysis to balanced-budget policies. Battaglini (2014) presents a theory of
electoral competition where voters with stochastic preferences for parties determine public
debt accumulation and scal policy, but focuses on the e¢ ciency comparison of di¤erent
electoral rules and not on the political color of governments.
On the empirical side, a few papers have tested the implications of the strategic debt
models. For example, Lambertini (2003) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) test the implication
of the Persson-Svensson model that the incumbents probability of being voted out of o¢ ce
will impact debt accumulation. Lambertini (2003) nds little support for such strategic
use of debt in U.S. and OECD panel data, while Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) nds signicant
support in data on Swedish municipalities. These mixed ndings are not surprising in light
of the prediction of our model that the reelection probability has an ambiguous and e¤ect
on debt accumulation.
Two empirical studies by Franzese (2002) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) provide
some evidence about di¤erences in debt policy across governments of di¤erent color as
part of broader investigations of the empirical determinants of macroeconomic policies in
industrial democracies. Franzese (2002) notes that right-wing governments run on average
higher decits, although in his sample and empirical specication the e¤ect is quantitatively
small. In Franzeses view, the direction of the e¤ect is a puzzle, as it runs "opposite partisan-
theory expectation" (p.181-82). On the one hand, our theory shows that his nding is not
puzzling since it conforms with the prediction of a dynamic model of repeated voting. On
the other hand, our empirical analysis, which is based on a theory-driven specication
and on a more comprehensive data set, shows that the signicant correlation between debt
policy and color of the government is a robust feature of the data. Perotti and Kontopoulos
(2002) document that party ideology on the left-right spectrum is a signicant determinant
of government transfers in a panel of 19 OECD countries over the period 1970-1995, but
has no signicant e¤ect on the change in the primary decit or revenues. Apart from
the broader sample coverage, our approach di¤ers from theirs insofar as we focus on the
outstanding debt, which is the relevant state variable in our theory, rather than on the
primary decit.
A growing related politico-economic literature on time-consistent dynamic scal pol-
icy, where heterogeneous agents vote repeatedly on redistribution and taxation, includes
Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999), Hassler et al. (2003), Hassler et al. (2005), Song (2011,
2012), and Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008). These papers are also methodologically
similar to ours, although they assume a balanced government budget and do not deal with
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determinants of government debt.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model environment. Section
3 characterizes the political equilibrium with an exogenous interest rate. Section 4 embeds
the analysis in the general equilibrium model of a world economy comprising a continuum
of small open economies. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
The Appendix contains the microfoundation of the political model, a description of the
data with additional details, and the proofs of all formal propositions.
2 Model
A small open economy is populated by overlapping generations of two-period-lived agents
who work in the rst period and live o¤ savings in the second period. Their preferences
are dened over a private good, c, a public good, g; and labor e¤ort, h. The are two types
of agents, left-wing (l-type) and right-wing (r-type) voters, who di¤er in their preference
for public good consumption relative to private consumption. Each cohort comprises a
measure ~p 2 (0; 1) of l-type agents and a measure 1   ~p of r-type agents.4 The expected
utilities of a young and old agent of type s 2 fl; rg are, respectively:5
EUys = log(cys   v (h)) + ~s log(g) + E [U 0osjX] ; (1)
Uos = log(cos) + ~s log(g); (2)
where U 0os is the continuation value of the current young, E[] is an expectation operator,
andX  fz; ; hB;G; T ig. Here, z is the current state vector,   is the transition probability
matrix associated with exogenous political shocks, and hB;G; T i is a 3-tuple of equilibrium
policy functions. Each of these components of X is dened in Denition 1 below. ~s is a
type-specic preference weight. We assume that ~l > ~r, namely, l-types have a stronger
relative preference for public goods than have r-types.
We model the disutility from labor e¤ort, v (h), following Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Hu¤man (1988), and assume that v (h) = h1+1== (1 + 1=), where  > 0 parameterizes
the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply.  is a discount factor and  captures the relative
preference for public good of the old relative to the young.
Young agents choose labor supply and savings so as to maximize their expected utility,
subject to a lifetime budget constraint, cys + c0os=R = (1  )wh, where  is a linear
4Since in our theory politicians are purely o¢ ce-seeking agents, who simply implement the policy that
maximizes the election probability, we refer to governments as left- and right-leaning. Voters, instead, have
explicit ideologicalpreferences. Thus we refer to voters as being left- and right-wing.
5Note that the denition of EUys in Equation (1) involves an expectation operator, since the equilibrium
realization of future public good provision g0 depends on the equilibrium policy functions and on the future
realization of a stochastic process.
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tax levied on labor earnings. Following SSZ, we assume that the government cannot tax
consumption and wealth. The optimal choice of labor supply is H () = [(1  )w] ;
while the optimal saving decision yields S () = = ((1 + ) (1 + ))A () ; where A () 
[(1  )w]1+. The optimal consumption allocation over an individuals lifetime, which is
independent of the type s, is given by:
cy() =
1 +  (1 + )
(1 + ) (1 + )
A () and c0o() =
R
(1 + ) (1 + )
A () :
2.1 Production and Public Good Provision
The production technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas production function, Y =
QKH1 ; where K denotes capital, H is labor supply, and Q is total factor productivity.
Labor and capital markets are competitive, so factor prices equal the respective marginal
products. Capital is perfectly mobile and depreciates fully after one period. R is the world
interest rate.6 The equilibrium wage per unit of labor e¤ort is pinned down by the world
interest rate:
w = (1  )Q1=(1 )

R
=(1 )
:
To simplify the exposition we normalize Q so that w = 1. Then, the equilibrium stock of
domestic capital is K =
 
Q
R
1=(1 )
H.
The public good can only be provided by an elected government that has access to
international nancial markets from which it can borrow and lend at the rate R. Given
an outstanding debt, b, the government chooses the labor income tax,  , the public good
provision, g, and next-period debt, b0; subject to an intertemporal budget constraint,
b0 = g +Rb  H () : (3)
We assume that debt cannot be repudiated. This implies that the debt level cannot
exceed the natural borrowing limit. More formally, b = H () = (R  1) ; where  
arg max fH ()g is the tax rate corresponding to the top of the La¤er curve.
2.2 Political Model
Governments are elected through repeated elections in which all young and old agents vote,
and their term in power is just one period. The backbone political model is borrowed from
SSZ, who construct a dynamic version of the probabilistic voting model of Lindbeck and
6In this section, we take the world interest rate R as exogenous. In Section 4 we will endogenize it.
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Weibull (1987). The model in SSZ is augmented here with stochastic disturbances that we
interpret as political shocks. In the text, we focus on the equilibrium implications of the
model. In Appendix A.1, we lay out its microfoundations.
In every period there is a binary competition between two o¢ ce-seeking politicians who
announce scal policy platforms with commitment. Since politicians have no ideological
stance, the chosen platform maximizes the probability of winning the election, and simply
reects voterspreferences. Groups of voters di¤er in their ability to inuence the scal
policy outcome, due to heterogeneity in the perceived salience of the scal policy issue
relative other latent dimensions of the electoral competition. In equilibrium the scal
policy maximizes a weighted sum of the discounted expected indirect utilities of the di¤erent
groups of voters. We label this weighted sum a political objective function. We refer to
each groups weight as their political clout.
The political clout of left- and right-wing voters follows an exogenous stochastic process.
More formally, we denote by p and 1   p the political clout of l-type and r-types voters,
respectively. In the particular case in which the political clout reects only the size of each
group, we have p = ~p. However, in general, the clout also depends on time-varying shocks.
In particular, we assume that p follows a two-state Markov process with transition matrix
  (p0    (p)) and support p 2 fpl; prg. We assume that pl > pr, namely, the realization
pl corresponds to a large political clout of left-wing voters. The political clout of old and
young agents is instead xed, and denoted by ! and 1  !, respectively. If young and old
agents have equal clout, then, ! = 1=2.
Given these weights, the political objective function is given by:
EU = (1  !) [pEUyl + (1  p)EUyr] + ! [pUol + (1  p)Uor] ; (4)
where
EUys = 	y + (1 + ) log (A ()) + ~s log(g) + ~sE [log(g
0)jX] ; (5)
Uos = 	o + ~s log (g) ; (6)
are the indirect (expected) utilities of the four types of agents (s 2 fl; rg). The indirect
utilities are obtained by substituting the optimal consumption and labor supply choices,
cys = cy(); c
0
os = c
0
o() and h = H () ; into Equations (1)-(2). The terms 	y and 	o
are functions of constants and predetermined variables that do not a¤ect the political
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equilibrium.7 Standard algebra yields, then:
EU = 	 + [1 + !(  1)](p) log (g) + (1  !) (1 + ) log (A ())
+ (1  !) (p)E [log(g0)jX] ;
where (p) = p~l + (1  p)~r is a weighted average of the taste for public goods across left-
and right-wing voters, and 	  	y + 	o is a policy irrelevant constant.
Since (p) is a one-to-one mapping, it is convenient to dene l  (pl) and s  (ps),
where l > r: Thus,  2 fl; rg is a su¢ cient statistic of the political state. With this
in mind, henceforth, we ignore the stochastic variable p; and describe the realization of
political shocks in terms of shifts in the taste for public goods, , where 0    ().
Note that in our probabilistic voting model governments are purely rent-seeking entities
with no ideology of their own. One could alternatively consider a model where politicians
have their own partisan stand like in the citizen-candidate model of Besley and Coate
(1997). We believe that the insights of our analysis are robust to di¤erent assumptions
about the political model introducing elements of partisan politics. However, in our four-
group environment with repeated voting, the characterization of the equilibrium would be
more complicated, and multiple equilibria would arise. For this reason, we stick to the
probabilistic model in SSZ that is very tractable. With some slight abuse of terminology,
we refer to governments implementing scal policies that cater more to policy of left- and
right-wing voters as of left- and right-leaning governments, respectively.
3 Domestic Political Equilibrium
Fiscal policy is determined by the dynamic game between successive governments. We
rule out reputational mechanisms, and restrict attention to Markov-perfect equilibria where
governments condition their strategies only on payo¤-relevant state variables. Since private
wealth (i.e., accumulated savings) does not a¤ect the political preference of old voters, the
state vector comprises only the debt level and the political state variable. Henceforth,
we denote the state vector by z  (b; ), and the state space by 
  ( 1;b]  fl; rg.
Moreover, we condition the expectation operator E[] on the state  only, as the remaining
objects of X are contained in the equilibrium denition:
Denition 1 AMarkov-perfect political equilibrium (MPE) is a 3-tuple of functions hB;G; T i,
where B : 
 ! ( 1;b] is a debt rule, b0 = B (b; ), G : 
 ! [0;1) is a government ex-
penditure rule, g = G (b; ), and T : 
! ( 1; 1] is a tax rule,  = T (b; ), such that the
7In particular, 	o depends on the wealth of the old, which in turn depends on the lagged taxation, but
not on any current scal policy variable.
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scal policy rule is optimal and time consistent:
hB (b; ) ; G (b; ) ; T (b; )i
= arg max
b0;g;
(
[1 + !(  1)] log (g) + (1  !) (1 + ) log (A ())
+ (1  !) E [log (G (b0; 0)) j]
)
(7)
subject to
b0 = g +Rb  H () ;
b0  b;   1; g  0;
0    () :
In addition, the policy rules are consistent with the governments budget constraint,
B (b; ) = G (b; ) +Rb  T (b; ) H (T (b; )) : (8)
In words, the government chooses the current scal policy subject to a budget constraint,
under the expectation that next-periods scal policy will follow the time-consistent equilib-
rium function, g0 = G (b0; 0). Todays government takes into account that the current scal
policy a¤ects the future scal policy through its e¤ect on the state vector, in particular, on
debt.
The political objective function (7) shows that the governments concerns for next-
periods public good provision is proportional to : Since  is increasing in the political
clout of left-wing voters, left-leaning governments are more concerned with future public
good provision and warier of debt accumulation.8 Conversely, right-leaning governments
are more concerned with private consumption (i.e., low taxes), care less for g0, and are more
prone to debt accumulation.9
We focus on equilibria in which policy functions are di¤erentiable in b: We label such
equilibria di¤erentiable Markov-perfect political equilibria (DMPE)
8To see why more formally, note that g0 = G
 
b0; 0

, where G is decreasing in b0; as long as higher debt
implies lower public good provision an intuitive feature of the equilibrium that we prove below.
9Note that we abstract from capital income taxes. The results would be mitigated if a tight government
budget increased future capital income taxation. This would make young right-wing voters more scally
responsible than in our current setting. There are valid reasons to expect this e¤ect to be dominated by
the crowding out of future government expenditure. First, tax avoidance makes it di¢ cult to impose high
taxes on returns to capital, especially in a model with free international capital mobility. Second, in our
model capital income taxation is opposed unanimously by all old voters. Thus, the prediction that young
left-wing voters support more scal responsibility than do young right-wing voters is robust to reasonable
extensions of the model allowing for capital income taxes.
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Proposition 1 A DMPE is characterized by the following system of functional equations:
(1  !)(1 + )(1 + )
A(T (b; ))
=
[1 + !(  1)] 
G (b; )
[1  e(T (b; ))] ; (9)
1
G (b; )
=   (1  !) 
1 + !(  1)E

G1(B (b; ) ; 
0)
G(B (b; ) ; 0)
  ; (10)
and Equation (8). The term e()   (@H()=@)(=H()) denotes the tax elasticity of
the labor supply, and G1 denotes the partial derivative of G with respect to debt.
The rst equilibrium condition, (9), captures the intratemporal trade-o¤ between the
marginal cost of taxation and the marginal benet of public good provision for all types of
agents. This trade-o¤ reects both the political conict between young and old voters, and
that between left- and right-wing voters. Young left-wing voters want more public good
provision than do young right-wing voters. All old voters would like to set  =  so as to
maximize current public good provision, irrespective of their type.
The second equilibrium condition, (10), is a generalized Euler equation for public good
consumption. As in SSZ, it is young voters who impose scal discipline anticipating that
debt accumulation would crowd out future public good provision. The old, irrespective of
their type, would like the maximum public good provision and support setting taxes on the
top of the La¤er curve and debt equal to the borrowing limit. Fiscal discipline vanishes
altogether if ! = 1, namely, if old voters dictate their most preferred policy.
3.1 Inelastic Labor Supply
The system of functional equations (8)-(10) admits an analytical solution in the special
case when labor supply is inelastic, i.e.,  = 0. The solution features e() = 0; H () = 1,
and A () = 1    . Since taxes are not distortionary, the top of the La¤er curve is  = 1,
implying a borrowing limit of b = 1=(R  1).
The equilibrium is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume  = 0. There exists a DMPE characterized by the following policy
functions:
b0 = B (b; ) = b  (1  !)
1 + ! (  1)R  () 
 
b  b ; (11)
g = G (b; ) = R  ()   b  b ; (12)
 = T (b; ) = 1  (1  !)(1 + )
(1 + ! (  1)) R  () 
 
b  b ; (13)
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where b  1= (R  1),  2 fl; rg, and
 () =

1 +
(1  !) [(1 + ) + ]
[1 + !(  1)] 
 1
:
Since the constant () is strictly increasing in , @B=@ < 0, @G=@ > 0, and @T=@ >
0. Proposition 2 implies, then, that a political shift to the left leads to lower debt, higher
taxes, and larger government expenditures. More formally, given b; the debt issuance policy
shifts downwards, B(b; l) < B(b; r), while the tax policy and the government expenditure
policy shifts upwards, T (b; l) > T (b; r), and G(b; l) > G(b; r). Intuitively, a larger clout
of left-wing voters is equivalent to an increase in the public appreciation of public good
consumption relative to private consumption. Thus, a left-leaning government is wary of
debt accumulation because this crowds out future public good provision.
Interestingly, there exists an intermediate range of interest rates such that right-leaning
governments always accumulate debt, while left-leaning government always decrease it.
As we will show in Section 4, when the interest rate is determined endogenously as the
equilibrium outcome of a world economy comprising a continuum of ex-ante identical small
open economies, it falls necessarily into this range. Thus, this case is especially informative.
Corollary 1 Assume  = 0. Assume, in addition, that R is such that
1
(l)
<
(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)R <
1
(r)
:
Then, when  = r, the government accumulates debt, whereas when  = l, the government
reduces its debt.
Figure 1 illustrates the corollary. Under left-leaning governments, the debt policy func-
tion, B(b; l) lies below the 45-degree line and has a slope larger than unity. In contrast,
under right-leaning governments, the debt policy function, B(b; r) lies above the 45-degree
line and has a slope smaller than unity. Thus, right-leaning governments accumulate debt,
while left-leaning governments reduce it.
Figure 1 HERE
In an inuential article, Persson and Svensson (1989) argue that when governments
are subject to a positive probability of being replaced, they set debt policy strategically.
For instance, a right-leaning government issues more debt if it anticipates to be replaced
by a left-leaning government with a stronger taste for public expenditure. In our model,
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the transition probabilities of the stochastic political process do not enter the equilibrium
functions of Proposition 2. This implies that only the current political preferences matter
in equilibrium. In contrast, the political equilibrium is not a¤ected by the persistence of
the political color of governments; in particular, a permanent political shift has the same
e¤ect as a temporary one. This surprising result hinges on the cancellation of an income
and a substitution e¤ect. Suppose, for example, that an incumbent left-leaning government
anticipates a shift to the right. On the one hand, scal discipline today yields a lower re-
turn to left-wing voters since in the next period a right-leaning government will spend only
a small share of potential resources, (b   b0), on public goods, and use instead large part
of them to cut taxes. This substitution e¤ect reduces the incumbent left-leaning govern-
ments wariness to debt accumulation. On the other hand, left-wing voters have a higher
marginal utility of future government expenditure precisely when the next government has
a lower propensity to spend on public goods. This income e¤ect strengthens the scal
discipline of the incumbent left-leaning government. Under logarithmic preferences and
non-distortionary taxation the income and substitution e¤ects cancel out. In the general
case the sign of this strategic e¤ect is ambiguous. However, as we will show in the next
section, the size of the strategic e¤ect is quantitatively very small in a calibrated economy
featuring an empirically plausible labor supply elasticity.
In summary, in our environment the sign of the strategic e¤ect emphasized by Persson
and Svensson (1989) is ambiguous, being exactly zero under logarithmic preferences, and
non-distortionary taxation. This ambiguity may explain why the empirical literature has
found mixed support for this prediction (see Lambertini (2003) and Pettersson-Lidbom
(2001)).
3.2 Elastic Labor Supply
In the general case with an elastic labor supply,  > 0, the DMPE does not admit a closed-
form solution. However, our numerical analysis shows that the results are qualitatively
similar to those derived with an inelastic labor supply. The main di¤erence is that the debt
policy function yields an interior determined government debt level even for a perpetual
sequence of the same realization of the stochastic political process. The intermediate range
of debt levels between the long-run debt level of the left and that of the right is the support
of an ergodic debt distribution.10 Within such a range, the debt dynamics have the same
qualitative features as those in Section 3.1: right-leaning governments accumulate debt
while left-leaning governments reduce it. This is the main theoretical prediction that we
10At very low debt levels, both left-leaning and right-leaning governments will accumulate debt though
accumulation will be less pronounced for left-leaning governments and vice versa at very high debt levels.
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will test in Section 5.
For the numerical analysis, we use a standard projection method with Chebyshev col-
location to approximate the functions B(b; ), G(b; ), and T (b; ) characterized in Propo-
sition 1.11 A summary of the values of all parameters is listed in Table 1.
Table 1 HERE
The length of a period is 30 years. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to  = 2=3,
which implies that the top of the La¤er curve is at  = 60%, in line with Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011). We set ! = 0:25 to reect the political inuence of the old.12 We set  = 2:17
so as to match the federal tax revenue of 17:2% as a share of GDP in the U.S. over the
period 1950-2013.13 This value of  implies that the old care more for public goods than
the young, a feature that we view as plausible (e.g., elderly people care about parks, street
safety, etc.).
The preference parameters r and l govern the strength of the scal discipline for
right- and left-leaning governments, respectively. To estimate these parameters within the
model we rely on our empirical estimates Republican and Democrat administrationstaste
for government debt using U.S. data. In particular, using the point estimates of how the
political party of the president a¤ects the dynamics of the debt-output ratio, we calculate
what the long-run debt-output ratio would converge to if Republican (Democrat) presidents
were in power for ever. Accordingly, the parameters r and l are calibrated so the model
matches the associated long-run debt levels conditional on the right-leaning (left-leaning)
government remaining in power for an arbitrarily long period of time.14 More formally,
denote the empirical debt-GDP ratio conditional on a perpetual administration of type 
by ~bt().15 Then:
~bt+1()  ~bt() = ^() + ^2~bt():
11This is the same algorithm used by SSZ. We use six collocation nodes to approximate each of the
equilibrium functions and apply Broydens method to solve the resulting system of equations. See Judd
(1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2002), for example, for details about the implementation of projection
methods.
12SSZ motivates this choice with ! capturing the the share of aggregate votes cast by voters 61 years
and older in the 2004 US election.
13As labor income is a fraction (1 ) of output, this corresponds to a labor income tax rate of 17:2%=(1 
) = 25:8%:
14Note that if the same type of government is in power for ever, the model is essentially the same as
SSZ. Consistent with SSZ, we nd that for reasonable values of , the debt level in the model converges to
a steady state bounded away from the debt limit.
15In the the debt regression specied in (14) of Section 5, ^2 is the estimate of the autoregressive
coe¢ cient 2, and ^() the linear prediction evaluated at demot = I f = lg, bt = 0, and at means for the
other variables.
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The stationary debt level associated with this autoregressive process is ~b() =  ^()=^2.
Using the estimates in column (5) of Table 2 (Section 5) yields the long-run debt levels
~b(r) = 3:207=0:041 = 78:2% corresponding to an innite sequence of Republican ad-
ministrations and ~b(l) = 1:216=0:041 = 29:7% corresponding to an innite sequence
of Democratic administrations. These two numbers are targets of the calibration of r and
l. This calibration yields fr; lg = f0:536; 0:563g.16
As a benchmark we assume the stochastic political process to be i.i.d., i.e., (0 = sj =
s) = 1=2, where (
0j) denotes the transition probabilities of the Markov process.17 The
results are not sensitive to changes in the persistence parameters.
The annualized interest rate is set to R1=30 = 1:04. With a capital share of output of
 = 1=3, this implies an annualized capital-output ratio of 3. Finally, we set the parameter
 to (0:986)30 so that the annualized ratio of net wealth to GDP of the economy is 3 at
the average realization of , where net wealth is dened as savings of the young minus
government debt.
Figure 2 HERE
Figure 2 plots the policy function obtained from the numerical analysis for the case
of i.i.d. political shocks. As in the analytical solution under inelastic labor supply, a
political shift to the right shifts the debt policy upwards, B(b; l) < B(b; r), and both the
tax and the government expenditure policy downwards, T (b; l) > T (b; r) and G(b; l) >
G(b; r). The bottom-right panel shows the pattern of debt accumulation in an economy
with perpetual left- or right-leaning governments, respectively, starting from the average
debt level in the stationary equilibrium. The long-run debt levels associated with perpetual
rule of each party are pinned down by the intersection of the debt policy function B(b; )
with the 45-degree line in the top-left panel. If we denote these debt levels by B(r)
and B(l), respectively, the bottom-right panel shows the corresponding stationary debt-
output levels, ~b(r)  B(r)=Y (r) and ~b(l)  B(l)=Y (l): As explained above, our
calibration implies ~b(r) = 78:2% and ~b(l) = 29:7%, respectively.
Figure 3 HERE
16Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix shows how the policy functions change when the di¤erence between
r and l is twice as large as in the benchmark parametrization. Increasing the di¤erence between r and
l increases the predicted changes in scal policy following a political shift. Consequently, the stationary
world distribution of debt becomes more spread out compared to the benchmark. We view it as a strength
that the quantitative predictions are sensitive to r and l: it shows that these parameters, which play a
key role in the theory, are sharply identied by empirical moments of debt dynamics.
17Since one period is 30 years, the i.i.d. case is a very close match for the persistence observed in the
data.
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Figure 3 shows the impulse-response of scal policy to a long sequence of right-leaning
governments, starting from the long-run debt level ~b(l). The gure shows di¤erent cases
corresponding to alternative persistence parameters. If we denote by  the probability
that the government at t + 1 has the same color as the government at t, then,  = 1=2
yields the benchmark i.i.d. case. This case is represented by the solid line. The dashed
and the dash-dotted lines correspond to the case of high autocorrelation,  = 9=10, and
negative autocorrelation,  = 1=10; (assumed to be the same for both right- and left-leaning
governments), respectively. The remaining parameters are unchanged. In spite of the large
di¤erence in persistence, the dashed and the dash-dotted lines are fairly close to the solid
line representing the i.i.d. case. Thus, changes in the persistence of the political regime
have small quantitative e¤ects on debt accumulation This reects the fact that the size of
the substitution e¤ect is roughly equal to the opposing income e¤ect for reasonable labor
supply elasticities. The e¤ect of strategic debt issuing is generally small.
So far, we have assumed logarithmic utility. For robustness, in Figures B.2 and B.3
of the online Appendix we display the numerical solution of our model when voters have
preferences featuring a constant relative risk aversion (RRA) of two over both private and
public good consumption. The results are similar to the logarithmic case.
3.3 Countercyclical scal policy
In this section, we outline an extension aimed to tease out the predictions of the theory
about the cyclical properties of the scal policy. A complete model of business cycle
uctuations is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we consider a simple experiment in
which we assume that the economy has fallen into a one-period recession. The downturn is
expected to end in the following period and never to occur again. We start by considering
the case of inelastic labor supply for which we can obtain an analytical solution.
Let w0 < w = 1 denote the wage rate during the initial recession. In line with the small
open economy assumption, the rate of return of debt R is not a¤ected by the domestic
recession. The benchmark model of the previous sections must be augmented by three
recession-specic policy rules, G0 (b; ) ; T0 (b; ) and B0 (b; ) ; that only apply in the rst
period. These policy rules must be consistent with the governments budget constraint:
B0 (b; ) = G0 (b; ) +Rb  w0  T0 (b; ) H0 (T0 (b; )) :
17
In addition, the policy functions maximize the political objective function:
hB0 (b; ) ; G0 (b; ) ; T0 (b; )i
= arg max
b0;g;
(
[1 + !(  1)] log (g) + (1  !) (1 + ) log (A0 ())
+ (1  !) E [log (G(b0; 0)) j]
)
;
where the labor supply and the after-tax income in recession is H0 () = [(1  )w0]
and A0 = [(1  )w0]1+, respectively. Consider the case of inelastic labor supply,  = 0.
Writing the Lagrangian, calculating the rst-order conditions, and rearranging terms, yields
the following policy rules:18
b00 = B0 (b; ) = b 
(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)R   () 
 
b  b+ (1  !)
1 + ! (  1)   ()  (1  w0) ;
g0 = G0 (b; ) = R  () 
 
b  b   () (1  w0) ;
 0 = T0 (b; ) = 1  (1  !) (1 + )
[1 + !(  1)] 
G0 (b; )
w0
;
where (1  w0) parameterizes the severity of the recession and, recall,  () is strictly in-
creasing in .
The ratio between private consumption and public good consumption (i.e., (1   0)w0=g0)
is the same in the recession as in normal times. However, the recession a¤ects the intertem-
poral margin, and in particular debt accumulation. Not surprisingly, debt accumulation is
increasing and public expenditure as well as tax revenue falling in the size of the recession,
since a larger recession increases the need of private and public consumption smoothing.
More interestingly, the extent of the countercyclical debt policy is increasing in : More
formally,
@2B0
@ (1  w0) @ =
(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)  
0 () > 0:
Thus, the theory predicts that a left-leaning government engages in more aggressive coun-
tercyclical debt policy than does a right-leaning government. The reason is as follows.
During normal times, a left-leaning government chooses relatively low public savings (low
b0) in order to induce a large public consumption next period. To nance this they impose
large taxes, inducing low private consumption and, hence, low private savings. Intuitively,
all young voters want to smooth both private and public consumption. So, when a reces-
sion strikes, every government will reduce both private and public savings (relative to the
levels in normal times) so as to boost current public and private consumption. However,
18For the analytical derivations, see Section 3.3 of the Online Appendix.
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since a left-leaning government has relatively more public savings, this is the funds that
will tapped more into, in the sense that it will shoulder the largest absolute reduction.
Therefore, left-leaning governments are more prone to relax scal discipline and expand
debt in a recession, relative to the policies they pursue during normal times.
The calibrated economy with elastic labor supply exhibits the same pattern as the
economy with inelastic labor supply analyzed above: in response to a one-time recession, all
governments increase debt and reduce expenditure and tax revenue. We choose a recession
that corresponds to a 10% drop in the youngs earnings at the average stationary debt
level, and plot the changes of debt growth, expenditure, tax revenue and consumption of
the young in absolute levels (Figure B.4 in the Online Appendix) and as a fraction of GDP
(Figure B.5 in the Online Appendix). The dotted vertical line in each panel indicates the
average stationary debt level or debt-GDP ratio, respectively.
Left-leaning governments run larger decits and increase the debt more than do right-
leaning governments see the top left panel of Figure B.4 . The same gure shows that both
government expenditures and tax revenues fall in a recession, the absolute decline being
larger for left- than for right-leaning governments. One should bear in mind, however, that
GDP also falls in a recession. For the empirical predictions to be comparable with the
empirical analysis in Section 5 below, we normalize the debt, expenditure and tax revenue
by the GDP level both in the data and in theory. Figure B.5 shows that the debt-GDP
ratio increases for all debt levels compared to normal times, and more so for left-leaning
governments. Thus, a robust prediction of the theory is that left-leaning governments
pursue a more aggressive decit-spending policy in recession both in absolute levels, and
normalized by GDP. Furthermore, Figure B.5 also illustrates that the expenditure-GDP
ratio (top-right panel) is increasing and the e¤ective tax rate falling (bottom-left panel) in
response to the recession. The theory predicts that the expenditure-GDP ratio increases
more under left-leaning governments, while right-leaning governments implement larger tax
cuts. It is reassuring that the predictions of the calibrated economy are qualitatively in
line with the (analytical) predictions of the inelastic labor supply economy laid out above.
4 General Equilibrium
So far, we have taken the interest rate R as given. In this section, we determine the
interest rate endogenously, assuming that there is a global capital market and that the world
comprises a large number of countries with the same preferences, technology, and political
process. The goal of this section is to derive predictions about the long-run distribution of
debt across countries.
We focus rst on the case with inelastic labor supply. In this case, we can characterize
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analytically the stationary equilibrium of the world economy. Later we extend the analysis
to the case of elastic labor supply.
4.1 Stationary Political Equilibrium
Every period each small open economy draws an idiosyncratic realization of the parameter
 2 fl; rg. Consequently, even if the countries are ex-ante identical, a countrys debt
depends on its individual history of shocks.
The state vector comprises the distribution of government debt and private wealth
across countries. We focus on equilibria where the world interest rate is constant over time,
and the policy rules of each country are functions of the country-specic state variables
(as analyzed above) and the constant world interest rate R. In doing so, we follow the
equilibrium concept pioneered in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). We focus on a
slightly more general stationary equilibrium denition than in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari
(1994) a quasi-stationary equilibrium that allows the cross-country debt distributions
to be expanding over time, although the mean debt level conditional on the realized shock,
, is constant over time. Since we allow for ever-expanding distributions, we also impose
no lower bounds on government debt and taxes, b0 2 ( 1;b(R)  H()=(R   1)] and
 2 ( 1; 1].19
Let ftg1t=0 be a set of probability measures dened on (
;
), where 
 = ( 1;b (R)]
fl; rg is the individual state space, and 
 is the Borel -algebra on 
 (i.e., the set of all
possible subsets of 
). Thus, for any set x 2 
, the measure of countries whose individual
state vectors lie in the set x in period t is given by t (x).
Denition 2 A quasi-stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium (QSMPE) is a con-
stant interest rate R, a sequence of probability measures ftg1t=0 dened on (
;
),
and a set of functions hB;G; T i, where B : 
  R+ !   1;b (R) is a debt rule,
b0 = B (b; ; R), G : 
R+ ! [0;1) is a government expenditure rule, g = G (b; ; R), and
T : 
R+ ! ( 1; 1] is a tax rule,  = T (b; ; R), such that the domestic political equilib-
rium conditions in (11), (12) and (13) of Proposition 2 are satised for b0 2 ( 1;b(R)]
and, in addition, the following three conditions hold:
19Alternatively, we could dene a sequence of lower bounds becoming increasingly wide and growing at
the rate of the stationary distributions dispersion.
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(1) The world asset market clears:Z


fS (T (b; ; R)) B (b; ; R)g dt (b; )
=
Z


X
02fl;rg
 (0j)K (T (B (b; ; R) ; 0; R) ; R) dt (b; ) ;
where the left-hand side is aggregate savings minus bond holdings and the function
K (T (B (b; ; R) ; 0; R) ; R)
is the next-period capital stock for a country with current state (b; ) and a realization
0 next period given the Markov transition probability,  (0j).
(2) The sequence of probability measures ftg1t=0 is consistent with the individual policy
rule:
t+1 (x) =
Z


I f(B (b; ; R) ; 0) 2 xg dt (b; ) ; for all x 2 
:
(3) The conditional average debt is time invariant:
Et+1 [b j i] = Et [b j i] ; 8i 2 fl; rg; t  0;
which implies thatZ


b  I f = ig dt+1 (b; ) =
Z


b  I f = ig dt (b; ) ; i 2 fl; rg; t  0:
In the following we provide a proposition that illustrates the functional form of the
quasi-stationary equilibrium interest rate when the political shock has no persistence.20
Proposition 3 Let  = 0. Then, there exists a di¤erentiable QSMPE with an associated
constant interest rate R; given by Equation (19). If the political shock is i.i.d., then
R =
1 + !(  1)
(1  !)
2
(l) + (r)
:
Note that Corollary 1 applies to this stationary equilibrium interest rate. Therefore,
the discussion of the political equilibrium under political shocks provided in Section 3.1,
20The proof of Proposition 3 presented in Appendix A.3 is actually more general. We characterize the
stationary equilibrium interest rate for any symmetric persistence probability  2 (1=2; 1). The i.i.d. case
follows with persistence parameter ! 1=2:
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including the location of the debt policy rules in Figure 1, apply even when the world econ-
omy is restricted to be in a stationary equilibrium: right-leaning governments accumulate
debt, while left-leaning governments reduce the debt level.
A similar result applies to the calibrated economy with elastic labor supply that we
analyzed in Section 3.2. First, note that the equilibrium Denition 2 applies also to the
case of elastic labor supply. For all parameter congurations we have tried, we have found a
unique equilibrium consistent with Denition 2, i.e., a QSMPE.21 However, with an elastic
labor supply the equilibrium we have found features a unique time invariant stationary
distribution in the long run. More precisely, there exists a measure  dened on (
;
)
such that  = t for all t  0, and the cross-country distribution of debt converges to 
regardless of the initial distribution of debt.
Second, recall that  was calibrated so that when simulating the economy for a very
long time and taking the sample average for the economy, the annualized average domestic
private wealth to GDP ratio minus the annualized domestic government debt to GDP ratio
was equal to 3. Such a level of capital would, in a closed economy, generate an annualized
return to capital of R1=30 = 1:04. Moreover, note that when the stationary equilibrium is
unique, the moments of a su¢ ciently long realization of an individual economy do converge
to the stationary equilibrium distribution regardless of the initial conditions (see Aiyagari
1994). This implies that the calibrated economy of Section 3.2 actually coincides with the
allocations in a general stationary equilibrium consistent with Denition 2.22
Note that in equilibrium, the range of the stationary distribution of cross-country debt
equals (B(l;R); B(r;R)), where the notation B(;R) denotes the debt level an indi-
vidual economy will converge to given an interest rate R and an arbitrarily long sequence
of realizations t = . Hence, in the long run the debt of every country is bounded between
the limiting debt levels B(r;R) and B(l;R). We plot the stationary debt distribution
consistent with our parametrization in the top-left panel of Figure 4. By targeting the
bounds of the ergodic set alone, our model generates a unimodal distribution of govern-
ment debt across countries, which is broadly in line with the empirical distribution that we
observe for the U.S. and other OECD countries with a majoritarian electoral system over
the period 1960-2010 (top-right panel).23 Given that political shocks are the only source
21We have experimented with congurations of the free parameters that include  2 (0; 1), ! 2
[2=10; 3=10],  2 (0; 2=3], and a relative risk aversion over private and public consumption, RRA 2 [1; 2]:
22To compute the stationary equilibrium, we follow a standard approach for solving an Ayiagari (1994)
economy (see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent 2012). In particular, given an educated guess for the equilibrium
interest rate, R0, we solves for the political equilibrium functions B(b; ; R0); G(b; ; R0), and T (b; ; R0).
We then simulate 10000 economies for 500 periods and check whether the world asset market clears on
average. We then run a rootnder on this routine to nd the equilibrium interest rate, R; that clears the
world asset market.
23We follow the classication in Persson and Tabellini (1999), this sample comprises Australia, Canada,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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of variation in the model, it seems reasonable that the empirical debt distribution appears
more spread out as it is a¤ected by other shocks as well. The two bottom panels show the
empirical distribution for the full panel of twenty-four OECD countries that we consider for
the empirical analysis in Section 5.2. In that sample the debt-GDP ratios are more skewed
to the right than the benchmark parametrization of our model predicts. The mass point
around 110% of GDP is mostly driven by Greece, Italy, and Belgium, and the observations
in the upper tail are those of Japan. Those debt levels might be the result of shocks that
are not part of our theory.
Figure 4 HERE
Recall that our hypothesis that right-leaning governments accumulate debt while left-
leaning governments reduce it applies only to countries with a debt level in between
B(l;R) and B(r;R). This coincides with the support of the stationary distribution,
which in turn implies that in the absence of other shocks than those to , our theoretical
hypothesis will be the empirically relevant prediction in the long run. To see this, consider
a country that starts with a debt level above the maximum stationary debt level B(r;R).
Such a situation might have occurred due to a shock we have not modeled here, for example
a large one-time exogenous government spending requirement due to, say, a natural disaster
or a war. In the aftermath of the disaster, such a country will reduce the initial high debt
no matter what is the political color of its government.24 However, once the debt is back
in the stationary range, it will again follow the dynamics of Proposition 2.
Finally, note that if a shock to debt for some reason were to move debt out of the
stationary region, debt will eventually revert to the stationary region. Moreover, recall
that any stationary stochastic process exhibits some mean reversion. It follows that the
dynamics of debt in this model imply some mean reversion of debt.
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we test the empirical predictions of the theory. Our model predicts that debt
accumulation should be larger under right-leaning than under left-leaning governments. It
also predicts  under the realistic assumption of distortionary taxation  that debt is
mean reverting. For this reason, we follow the empirical specication of Bohn (1998), who
regresses debt growth in the U.S. on the initial debt-GDP ratio, and introduce dummies
capturing the political inclination of governments. Since the low-frequency dynamics of
24The U.S. and the U.K. followed such a pattern for government debt after the large build-up of debt
during WWII.
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government debt is driven by demographic variables determining the nancing needs of the
pension system and health expenditure, we control in our regressions for the fraction of
population aged above 65 and below 15. We also control for unemployment to lter out
the cyclical component of the debt-GDP ratio, due to both automatic factors (such as the
reduction of the tax revenue during recessions) and active scal policy at business cycle
frequencies. This also allows us to test the prediction that left-leaning governments adopt
more counter-cyclical debt policies.
We consider rst the time-series analysis for the United States. The U.S. is a natural
testing ground, since it has a presidential two-party system where, at least since World War
II, the Republican Party has positioned itself consistently to the right of the Democratic
Party.25 Then, we extend the analysis to the e¤ects of political shifts within countries in
a panel of OECD countries. This extension poses some challenges. In many continental
European countries, the classication of the color of governments is ambiguous, due to the
frequent occurrence of coalition governments, resulting in signicant measurement error.26
With this motivation, we present rst the results for the full sample of countries for which
data are available, and then restrict the sample to countries with a majoritarian electoral
system. Following the classication of Persson and Tabellini (1999), this sample comprises
Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In all these
countries the data show a clear-cut alternation in power between left- and right-leaning
governments.
A caveat is that we treat political shifts as exogenous, ignoring feedbacks from the
debt policy to the probability that the incumbent party is reelected. While such feedbacks
cannot be ruled out, they are unlikely to have a major e¤ect on our estimated coe¢ cients.
Given the di¢ culty in nding valid instruments, we do not try to address this possible
endogeneity issue, and interpret the results as correlations.
5.1 United States
The data for U.S. scal policy are from the historical tables of the U.S. O¢ ce of Management
and Budget. The civilian unemployment rate is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
the demographic variables are from the OECD (2014a) Employment and Labour Market
25A potential issue is that the color of the administration may di¤er from the majorities controlling the
Senate and the House of Representatives. For this reason, we do extensive robustness analysis below.
26Italy during the so-called rst republic (i.e., until 1992) is a good example of such an ambiguitiy.
During the period 1976-79, the cabinet was a single-party expression of the Christian Democratic Party
(centre-right), but counted on the parliamentary support of the Communist Party. Thereafter, a sequence
of Five-Party governments led by either Christian Democratic or Socialist prime ministers were in charge
throughout the 1990s, with the opposition of the Communist Party. This is commonly regarded as a shift
to the right, although the presence of a party labeled socialist in the government makes this classication
ambiguous. The alternance between left and right is instead straightforward since 1992.
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Statistics database.
We augment Bohns debt autoregressive model with a political dummy switching on
when the President is a Democrat.27 The baseline empirical specication is given by:
bt = 0 + 1  demot + 2bt + 3ut 1 + 0Xt + t; (14)
where t 2 1950 2013 denotes the scal year, bt is the gross federal debt-output ratio in the
beginning of the scal year, bt  bt+1   bt is the annual change in the debt-output ratio,
demot is a dummy variable which equals one when the president of the U.S. at the beginning
of scal year t is a Democrat, and ut 1 is the di¤erence between the unemployment rate and
its sample mean.28 Xt is a vector of control variables including the demographic structure
(fraction of the population aged over 65 and below 15), and two dummies capturing federal
election years, and whether the U.S. was involved in a war, respectively.29 The dummy
for the election year captures the possibility that the electoral competition a¤ects debt
dynamics, although in practice this turns out to have no signicant e¤ect.
Table 2 HERE
Table 2 reports the estimation results, with cluster-robust t-statistics in parentheses.
Standard errors are adjusted for cluster correlation within presidential terms (alternative
clustering strategies are discussed below in the robustness section). The estimate of our
main coe¢ cient of interest, 1, yields an average e¤ect of a democratic administration
over the presidential term which allows for potentially sluggish e¤ects of the color of the
administration on scal policy.
A Democratic presidency is associated with an average reduction in the debt-GDP ratio
ranging between an annual 2%-2.5% across the di¤erent specications. The estimated
coe¢ cients are statistically signicant at the 1% level. Column (1) reports the result of
a specication without further control variables. Controlling for war and demographic
structure reduces only marginally the absolute value of the estimate of 1 (column (2)).
The results are robust to ltering out changes in the debt-GDP ratio associated with
27Bohn (1998) controls for the measure of temporary government spending from Barro (1986), which
captures mainly the temporary component of military spending that accompanies wars. In our baseline
specication, we control for a dummy measuring the U.S. involvement in a major war, and show the
robustness of our results in a specication that includes the cyclical component of U.S. defense expenditures
as an additional control in Section 5.1.1.
28In the U.S., scal year t starts on 1 Oct of year t   1 and ends on 30 Sep of year t. Prior to 1976 it
started on 1 Jul of year t   1 and ended on 30 Jun of year t: We control for the lagged rather than the
current unemployment rate to limit concerns with reverse causation.
29The war periods include 1950-1953 (Korean War), 1960-1975 (Vietnam War), 1990-1991 (Gulf War),
2001-ongoing (Afghanistan War), 2003-2011 (Iraq War).
25
business cycle uctuations, proxied by the lagged unemployment rate (column (3)). The
coe¢ cient on the lagged debt-GDP ratio is negative, consisting with Bohns result that
debt is mean-reverting, being signicant at the 10% level in the specications of columns
(5)(6) including all controls.
Column (4) shows the interesting result that Democratic administrations adopt more
counter-cyclical debt policies than do Republican administrations although the e¤ect is
marginally insignicant. This is consistent with the extension outlined in Section 3.3 pre-
dicting that left-leaning governments should be more prone to issue debt during recessions.
While this result is more fragile, the main e¤ect of the administrations color is robust:
Democratic administrations are less prone to debt accumulation when the unemployment
rate is at its average level. Finally, in columns (5)(6), we introduce a dummy switching
on during the Great Recession (20082010). The Great Recession has a large and highly
signicant positive e¤ect on debt accumulation. The estimated coe¢ cient of demot falls
slightly in absolute value, but remains highly signicant. In other words, the Obama ad-
ministration appears to follow the tradition of Democratic administrations to respond to
recessions by robust increases in the debt-GDP ratio. Its response is in fact stronger than
usual, likely due to the particular features of the crisis and of the policy response.
Our theory also predicts that, conditional on the debt level, Democratic administrations
tax and spend more. To test this further prediction, we repeat the time-series regression
specied in Equation (14) with taxes and nondefense expenditures as the dependent scal
variables. Taxation is measured by U.S. federal tax revenue as a fraction of GDP. Table
3 shows that, conditional on the outstanding debt-GDP ratio, Democratic administrations
raise more taxes. The estimated e¤ects are stable across specications and statistically
signicant. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is around 0.7 percentage points. The negative
and statistically signicant coe¢ cient of ut 1 conrms that Republican administrations
o¤er tax cuts during recessions as do Democratic administrations. The interaction e¤ect
is insignicant (with a negative point estimate that would go against the prediction of the
theory). All the results are robust to the inclusion of a dummy for the Great Recession.
Table 3 HERE
Table 4 HERE
Next, we consider federal non-defense government expenditure as percentage of GDP.
Although defense is a public good, it is fundamentally di¤erent from other goods, being
largely driven by international conicts. Clearly, our assumption that left-wing voters value
public good provision more than do right-wing voters cannot capture military expenditure.
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Table 4 reports the results. Conditional on debt, we nd a robust positive e¤ect of the
Democratic administration dummy. These spend ca. 0.6 percentage points more on federal
nondefense expenditures compared to Republican administrations. The expenditure-GDP
ratio increases in recession under any administration, and more so under Democratic ad-
ministrations. These results conform with the predictions of the theory, and are again
robust to the inclusion of a dummy for the Great Recession.
5.1.1 Robustness
In this section we consider various robustness tests of our previous empirical results.
Partiescontrol over Congress In Tables 2 to 4 we focus on the party a¢ liation of
the sitting U.S. President. However, it is not uncommon for the party of the president not
to hold the majority of seats in one or both chambers of the U.S. Congress. This can in
principle a¤ect the conduct of scal policy. In Table 5, we report the results of regressions
where we break down the e¤ect of the color of the administration by the extent to which
they control the U.S. Senate or the House of Representatives.
Table 5 HERE
The estimates of the political variables reported in Table 5 are relative to the benchmark
of a strongRepublican presidency in which the Republican Party holds the majority in at
least one of the chambers of the U.S. Congress. The coe¢ cient of demot yields the e¤ect of
a strongDemocratic presidency relative to the benchmark. If the party of the President
controls (at least in part) the U.S. Congress, Democratic administrations accumulate less
debt, and choose higher taxes and higher nondefense government expenditures relative to
Republican administrations. Interestingly, the lack of control over the congress tends to
reduce debt accumulation under both Republican and Democratic administrations. The
e¤ect of not controlling the congress is stronger for Republican presidencies, where it is
highly signicant, while it is smaller in absolute value and statistically insignicant for
Democratic presidencies. In general, the evidence suggests that more scal discipline is
forced upon the administration of both colors, although the e¤ect is especially strong for
Republican presidents. The regression for taxes (columns (4)(6)) show no signicant
e¤ects of the party controlling the U.S. Congress. Finally, lack of control over the congress
appears to imply more non-defense expenditure under Republican administrations, and less
non-defense expenditure under Democratic administrations (columns (7)-(9)), suggesting
that a hostile congress imposes tighter constraints on the choice of the executive.
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Table 6 HERE
In summary, the results of Table 5 show that while the identity of the party holding a
majority in the congress is sometimes signicant, but overall fragile, its inclusion does not
a¤ect the main result of the previous section: Democratic administrations accumulate less
debt, and choose higher taxes and higher nondefense government expenditures relative to
Republican administrations.
We also test the robustness of the results to a ner classication of the political con-
trol over the congress and executive. In Table 6, we include in the regression an index
for Democratic political control ranging from 1 (Republicans control presidency, House of
Representatives and Senate) and 6 (Democrats control presidency, House of Representa-
tives and Senate) instead of the demot dummy.30 The results are largely robust. A higher
value of the index is associated with less debt accumulation, higher taxes, and higher ex-
penditure. Because of the categorical nature of the index, it is no longer possible to give
the estimated coe¢ cient a simple quantitative interpretation. However, the coe¢ cients are
estimated very precisely and are highly signicant.
Alternative business cycle indicators In our main specication we control for unem-
ployment. This is a common proxy for business cycle uctuations, and has the advantage
of being available in a standardized format for the whole set of OECD countries that we
consider in the panel regression below. It is also a highly visible indicator to politicians and
voters. In this section, we show that the results are robust to three alternative proxies of
the cyclical level of economic activity: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth, a recession
dummy according to the NBER classication, and the change (rather than the level) of the
unemployment rate.
Table 7 HERE
Table 7 presents the regression results for debt growth, taxes and non-defense expendi-
ture when we control for the lagged TFP growth (TFPt 1), based on the estimate of TFP
growth provided by the Bureau of Labor StatisticsMultifactor Productivity Database. In
order to interpret the coe¢ cients of the interaction model, we measure TFP growth as the
deviation from the sample average. The regressions where debt growth is the dependent
30The description of the other index values is: 5 (Democrats control presidency and senate only), 4 (De-
mocrats control presidency only), 3 (Democrats control house and senate only), 2 (Democrats control house
only), 1 (Republicans control, presidency, house and senat). Note that none of the omitted combinations
is ever observed in the postwar area.
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variable (columns (1)-(3)) yield similar results for the coe¢ cient of interest as in the base-
line model. The e¤ect of TFPt 1 is signicant and has the expected sign: when TFP
growth falls, there is more debt accumulation. The results for taxes (columns (4)-(6)) and
government expenditures (columns (7)-(9)) are also in accordance with the predictions of
the theory.
The results are also robust to using the lagged change in unemployment, ut 2 
ut 1   ut 2, or a dummy classifying as recessions scal years in which the NBER classies
as at least 6 months as recession times. We report the detailed results in Tables B.1 and
B.2 of the Online Appendix.
Miscellaneous The standard errors reported in Tables 2 to 4 are adjusted for cluster
correlation within presidential terms. Adjusting the error bands instead for autocorrelation
among unclustered observations (following Newey and West 1987) yields less conservative
condence intervals and more signicant coe¢ cients. The results are reported in Tables
B.3 to B.5 of the Online Appendix. There, we also report the standard errors that result
from clustering years with the same U.S. President (Table B.6), or that are resampled from
clusters in presidential terms (Tables B.7 to B.9).31 All clustering strategies yield highly
signicant coe¢ cients for the political variable of interest in all specications.
In the empirical specication presented in Equation (14) we run an autoregressive spec-
ication in the spirit of Bohn (1998). When debt growth is the dependent variable, 1  2
can be interpreted as the autoregressive coe¢ cient of the initial stock of debt, bt. Coherent
with the structure of our theoretical model, we use the same specication for the regressions
with the average tax rate and government expenditures as the dependent variables. The
results are robust if we control for bt 1 instead of bt to caution against potential endogeneity
concerns. As reported in Tables B.10 to B.12 of the Online Appendix, the coe¢ cient of the
political variable remains overall highly signicant across most specications. The size of
the coe¢ cient is also similar. Furthermore, in Table B.13 we show that our results hold up
independent of whether the U.S. federal debt is measured gross or net of debt held by other
federal government accounts, and in Table B.14 that our results are robust to including the
cyclical component of defense expenditures as an additional control variable. In the latter
specication, we separate the cyclical from the trend component of defense expenditures
using a Hodrick-Prescott lter with smoothing parameter 100.
A nal robustness test concerns the demographic control variables. As discussed in our
previous work (see Song et al. 2012), we believe that there is a structural link between
demographic trends and debt dynamics. However, one might be concerned that the corre-
31We use Statas jackknife option with default parameter values and resample from observation clusters
in the same presidential term.
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lation between these two variables be spurious and simply driven by a common trend. To
address this concern, we replace the demographic variable by its (lagged) rst di¤erence.
The results for the regressions in which debt growth and the average tax rate are the depen-
dent variables are unchanged (see Tables B.15 and B.16). However, the coe¢ cient of the
political variable for nondefense government expenditures turns insignicant and switches
sign (Table B.17).
5.2 Panel of OECD economies
In this section, we consider a panel of twenty-four OECD economies for the period 1950-
2010, using the data on debt-GDP ratios collected by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010).32 We
control for time-invariant heterogeneity and for common trends by including country xed
e¤ects and time dummies. We classify the political inclination of governments follow-
ing Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000, 2011), who assign scores for government and
parliament ranging from left-wing dominance to right-wing dominance.33 Since coalition
governments introduce a severe measurement error, we also present the results for a sub-
sample of ve countries in which the electoral rule follows a majoritarian principle. In
all such countries, there is an unambiguous alternation of governments between leftand
right. When we analyze the majoritarian subsample, we eliminate the dummy center
and stick to a binary left-right classication.34
More formally, we run a panel regression of the form
bit = 0t + 0i + 
l
1  leftt + c1  centert + 2bit + 3ui;t 1 + 0Xit + it: (15)
Right-leaning governments are the baseline comparison group. We refer to Appendix A.2
for a detailed discussion of the data.
Table 8 HERE
32The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. We exclude Turkey from the analysis
because it defaulted on its sovereign debt in 1978 and 1982 and gets a consistently low democratization
score for the postwar period according to the Polity IV Project. For Iceland we drop the years of the severe
nancial crisis in 2008-2010.
33Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2011) (an update of Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000)) covers
the postwar area up to 2007. We complete the missing observations with the classication of governments
on a left-center-right scale taken from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI, see Beck et
al. 2001). The exact procedure is discussed in the data Appendix A.2.
34In order to attain such an unambigous binary classication, we lump together center and left-leaning.
This reclassication applies only to Canada, where liberal governments are classied as "center" by Wold-
endorp, Keman, and Budge (2000, 2011) (while the conservative party is classied as "right").
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The results with the full sample are reported in Table 8. The coe¢ cient for the left-
leaning government dummy is consistently negative across all specications. However,
the coe¢ cient is statistically signicant for the period 1950-2007, but turns insignicant
when the Great Recession is included. In column (4) we include the entire sample period,
and allow for the debt policy of right- and left-leaning governments to respond di¤erently
to business cycle uctuations, in particular to the Great Recession. The results indicate
heterogeneity in the response to the Great Recession: left-leaning governments expand debt
on average 2.7% more annually than do right-leaning governments. This heterogeneity
conforms with the prediction of the extension in Section 3.3. In normal times, a political
switch to the left is associated with an average reduction in debt accumulation of 0.54%
(column (6)), about a third of the e¤ect estimated in the time-series analysis for the US.
The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10% level. There are no signicant di¤erences between
center and right-leaning. The high debt accumulation of center governments is likely to
be due to the bargaining process between coalition partners. Finally, the debt level is
signicantly mean reverting.
The results are stronger, and more precisely estimated, in the subsample of countries
with a majoritarian electoral system see Table 9. In this case, a political shift to the left
implies on average a reduction in debt accumulation between 0.61% and 0.71% (columns
(3)-(6)), statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Table 9 HERE
We also ran the regressions for the other scal variables in the OECD panel (see Table
A.2 in the Appendix).35 In the case of taxation, there is evidence that left-leaning and
centre governments set higher taxes than do right-leaning governments, in the full sample
(columns (1)-(3)). The evidence is again stronger in the subsample of countries with a
majoritarian rule (columns (4)-(9)).36 In our preferred specication with a full set of
controls (column (6)), left-leaning governments tax 0.39 percentage points more than do
right-leaning governments. The di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 1% level. The
analysis of government expenditure is limited by the unavailability of separate OECD data
for non-defense expenditure. The results for total government expenditure (which includes
military expenditure) are inconclusive.
In summary, the predictions of our theory concerning the relationship between political
shocks and scal policy are borne out in the post-war U.S. data for scal variables. Debt
35The tax data are taken from the OECD Tax Statistics database (OECD, 2014b).
36The evidence is stronger for total taxation (columns (4)(6)) then when one restricts attention to
central government taxation (columns (7)(9)), for which data are only available since 1973.
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growth increases under Republican governments conditional on the outstanding debt level.
In contrast, tax rates and government expenditures are higher under Democratic govern-
ments. Consistent with the predictions of the extension in Section 3.3, we nd evidence that
Democratic governments adopt a more robust counter-cyclical debt policy. The predictions
of the theory are also broadly consistent with the evidence from a panel of OECD countries.
The evidence is a stronger in a subsample of countries with a majoritarian electoral system.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a positive dynamic politico-economic theory of scal policy in the
presence of preference heterogeneity and political shocks. The theory predicts that right-
leaning governments are on average more prone to debt accumulation than are left-leaning
governments. However, during recessions it is the left-leaning governments that increase
debt more.
We test these predictions, and nd them to be consistent with the U.S.-time series
evidence for the post-war period. The nding from a panel of OECD countries are also
broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. Our results are in sharp contrast with
the rhetoric of the recent political debate, according to which left-leaning governments are
supposed to care less for scal responsibility. The likely source of this confusion is the
observation, that is both consistent with our theory and borne out in the data, that left-
leaning governments are more prone to activist counter-cyclical scal policies including more
aggressive debt expansion in downturns. This tradition has continued during the Great
Recession - when left-leaning governments have pursued more aggressive decit spending
policies than have right-leaning governments. However, decit spending is not an inherent
trait of left-leaning governments rather, the opposite appears to be true.
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A Appendix
A.1 Microfoundation of the Political Model
In this appendix we provide the microfoundation of the political model discussed in Section
2.2. In particular, we show that the equilibrium allocation arising from the voting model
is identical to the policy maximizing the political objective function in Equation (4).
Denote the four groups of voters as young left-wing (yl), young right-wing (yr), old
left-wing (ol), and old right-wing (or). Given the current scal policy f  (b0; g; ), the
indirect utility functions can then be expressed as:
EUys (f) = 	y + (1 + ) log (A ()) + ~s log(g) + ~sE [log(g
0)jX]
Uos (g) = 	o + ~s log (g) ;
where s 2 fr; lg and 	s contains all terms that are independent of current scal policy f .
The electoral competition involves two o¢ ce-seeking candidates, denoted by A and B.
Each candidate announces a scal policy vector f = (b0; g; ), subject to the government
budget constraint, b0 = Rb + g    H () ; and to b0  b:37 Since there are new elections
every period, the candidates cannot make credible promises over future policies. Moreover,
the candidates live only for one period so they have no concern for the future over and
above how the future a¤ects current votersutility. Voters choose either of the candidates
based on their scal policy announcements and on their relative appeal, as explained below.
In particular, a young voter of type s 2 fl; rg prefers candidate A over B if, given the
inherited debt b, the preference parameter s, the world interest rate, and the equilibrium
policy functions hB;G; T i which apply from tomorrow and onwards:
EUys (b
0
A; gA; A) > EUys (b
0
B; gB; B) :
Likewise, an old voter of type s prefers candidate A over B if:
Uos (gA) > Uos (gB) :
Let iJ (where J 2 fyl; yr; ol; org) denote an individual-specic parameter drawn from
a symmetric group-specic distribution that is assumed to be uniform on the support
[ 1=  2J ; 1=  2J]. Intuitively, a positive (negative) iJ implies that voter i has a bias
in favor of candidate B (candidate A). Note that the distributions have density J and
37The announcement over the current scal policy raises no credibility issue, due to the assumption that
the politicians are pure o¢ ce seekers and have no independent preferences on scal policy.
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that neither group is on average biased towards either candidate.
We assume that there exists variables y, o, l, and r such that yl = yl, yr =
yr, ol = ol, and or = or. l is assumed to be stochastic, whereas y, o,
and r are (for simplicity) time invariant. The current l is known when the candidates
announce their policy platforms. The stochastic variable  is an aggregate shock capturing
the ex-post average success of candidate B whose realization becomes known after the
policy platforms have been announced.  is drawn from a uniform i.i.d. distribution on
[ 1= (2 ) ; 1= (2 )].38 The sum iJ + captures the relative appeal of candidate B : it is the
inherent bias of individual i in group J for candidate B irrespective of the policy that the
candidates propose. The assumption of uniform distributions is for simplicity (see Persson
and Tabellini (2000), for a generalization).
Voters are rational and forward looking, i.e., they take into account the e¤ects of todays
choice on future private and public-good consumption. While they cannot decide directly
over future scal policy, they can a¤ect it through their choice of the next-period debt
level (b0), which a¤ects future policy choices through the policy functions B, T , and G, as
dened in Denition 1.
It is useful to identify the swing voterof each group, i.e., the voter who is ex-post
indi¤erent between the two candidates:
ys (fA; fB) = EUys (fA)  EUys (fB)  
os (gA; gB) = Uos (gA)  Uos (gB)  ;
where s 2 fl; rg. Conditional on ; the vote share of candidate A is
A (fA; fB)
= 1  B (fA; fB)
=
~p
2
yl

yl (fA; fB) +
1
2yl

+
1  ~p
2
yr

yr (fA; fB) +
1
2yr

+
~p
2
ol

ol (gA; gB) +
1
2ol

+
1  ~p
2
or

or (gA; gB) +
1
2or

=
1
2
+
~p
2
yl [EUyl (fA)  EUyl (fB)  ] + 1  ~p
2
yr [EUyr (fA)  EUyr (fB)  ]
+
~p
2
ol [Uol (gA)  Uol (gB)  ] + 1  ~p
2
or [Uor (gA)  Uor (gB)  ] ;
where a fraction ~p of young and old voters is of type l. Note that A and B are stochastic
38The realization of  can be viewed as the outcome of the campaign strategies to boost the candidates
popularity. Such an outcome is unknown ex ante.
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variables. The probability that candidate A wins is then given by:
PA = Prob

A (fA; fB)  1
2

= Prob
"
 < ~p
yl

[EUyl (fA)  EUyl (fB)] + (1 ~p)
yr

[EUyr (fA)  EUyr (fB)]
~p

ol [Uol (gA)  Uol (gB)] + 1 ~p or [Uor (gA)  Uor (gB)]
#
= Prob
"
 < ~p
yl

[EUyl (fA)  EUyl (fB; z)] + (1 ~p)yr [EUyr (fA)  EUyr (fB)]
~pol

[Uol (gA)  Uol (gB)] + (1 ~p)or [Uor (gA)  Uor (gB)]
#
;
where   ~pyl + (1  ~p)yr + ~pol (1  ~p)or. Denote !  o= (o + y) and p 
~pl (o + y) =. The probability PA can then be expressed as:
PA =  (1  !) p [EUyl (fA)  EUyl (fB)] +  (1  !) (1  p) [EUyr (fA)  EUyr (fB)]
+
1
2
+  !p [Uol (gA)  Uol (gB)] +  ! (1  p) [Uor (gA)  Uor (gB)] :
Since both candidates seek to maximize the probability of winning the election, the
Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
f A = arg max
fA
f(1  !) p [EUyl (fA)  EUyl (fB)] + (1  !) (1  p) [EUyr (fA)  EUyr (fB)]
+!p [Uos (gA)  Uos (gB)] + ! (1  p) [Uor (gA)  Uor (gB)]g
f B = arg max
fB
f(1  !) p [EUyl (fA)  EUyl (fB)] + (1  !) (1  p) [EUyr (fA)  EUyr (fB)]
+!p [Uos (gA)  Uos (gB)] + ! (1  p) [Uor (gA)  Uor (gB)]g :
Hence, the two candidatesplatform converge in equilibrium to the same scal policy max-
imizing the weighted-average utility of the young and old,
(b0A; g

A; 

A) = (b
0
B; g

B; 

B)
= arg max
b0;g;
f(1  !) pEUyl (f) + (1  !) (1  p)EUyr (f)
+!pUol (g) + ! (1  p)Uor (g)g ;
subject to the government budget constraint. This is the political objective function (4)
given in the body of the paper.
The analysis outlined thus far applies equally to both deterministic and stochastic
models. Next, we assume that the stochastic variable l follows a two-state Markov chain
with transition probability matrix  . It follows that the variable p will also follow a two-
state Markov chain with the same transition probabilities,  , as assumed in the text.
The political model entails some important restrictions. First, agents only condition
their voting strategy on the payo¤-relevant state variable (here, debt). Second, the shock 
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is i.i.d. over time otherwise, the previous realization of  becomes a state variable, compli-
cating the analysis substantially. Third, although the assumption of uniform distributions
can be relaxed, it is necessary to impose regularity conditions on the density function in
order to ensure that the maximization problem is well behaved.
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A.2 Data
This appendix describes the data sources and the construction of variables for the empirical
analysis in Section 5.
U.S. time series: The scal policy measures used in the time-series regressions of
Tables 2, 3, and 4 are from the U.S. O¢ ce of Management and Budget. The demot
dummy switches on whenever the president is a¢ liated with the Democratic Party. In
election years, the dummy reects the political a¢ liation of the incumbent president (recall
that new U.S. Presidents take on o¢ ce at the start of the calendar year following each
election). The civilian unemployment rate is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the
demographic variables (fraction of the population aged over 65 and below 15) are from the
OECD (2014a) Employment and Labour Market Statistics. The dummy for the election
period refers to executive and legislative federal elections. The scal years a¤ected by the
great recession are 2008, 2009, and 2010. The war dummy switches on in the periods
1950-1953 (Korean War), 1960-1975 (Vietnam War), 1990-1991 (Gulf War), 2001-ongoing
(Afghanistan War), 2003-2011 (Iraq War). In Table 6 the index for Democratic political
control ranges from 1 (Republicans control presidency, the House of Representatives and
Senate) and 6 (Democrats control presidency, the House of Representatives and Senate).39
Finally, in Table B.2 of the Online Appendix, the recession dummy switches on for every
scal year involving more than 5 months of recession, according to the NBER classication.
OECD panel: In the panel regression of Tables 8 and 9, we use the government debt-
GDP ratios of 24 democratic OECD countries provided by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) for
the whole postwar period from 1950 to 2010.40 The detailed sample coverage is listed in Ta-
ble A.1 of the Appendix. We exclude Turkey because of its consistently low democratization
score during the postwar period according to the Polity IV Project. In addition, Turkey is
a middle-income country with many features that set it apart from those of industrialized
nations (for instance, Turkey defaulted its sovereign debt in 1978 and 1982). For Iceland
we drop the years of the severe nancial crisis, 2008-2010, during which the statistics are
heavily a¤ected by the systemic banking collapse. The panel data for total government tax
revenue used in Table A.2 of the Appendix are are from the OECD (2014b) Tax Statistics.
The data on total tax revenue is available for the period 1965-2010, whereas data on central
39The description of the other index values is: 5 (Democrats control presidency and senate only), 4 (De-
mocrats control presidency only), 3 (Democrats control house and senate only), 2 (Democrats control house
only), 1 (Republicans control, presidency, house and senate). Note that none of the omitted combinations
is ever observed in the postwar area.
40Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) reports gross central government debt for the following countries in our
sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States. For the United
Kingdom, only the net central government debt is available for the entire postwar period. For Iceland,
Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand and Poland the dataset reports the gross general government debt.
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government tax revenue are only available since 1973. The sample restriction imposed in
the analysis of Table 8 is described in the main text.
The data for unemployment and demographic structure are from the OECD (2014a)
Employment and Labour Market Statistics, and as in the analysis of the U.S. time-series,
we code as Great Recession the years 20082010.
We measure the ideological orientation of governments according to the Ideological
Complexion of Government and Parliament (CPG) index compiled by Woldendorp, Keman
and Budge (2011), which assigns scores for governments and parliaments ranging from 1
(right-wing dominance) to 5 (left-wing dominance). The criterion for dominance
is set by the share of seats in government and parliament. The CPG index is available
from 1950 until 2007, and we complete more recent years as well as the classication of
the U.S. using the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) provided by the World Bank.41
The DPI is based on the ideology of the chief executives party suggested in Beck et al.
(2001), and classies governments into three categories: right-wing (-1), center or coalition
(0), and left-wing (+1). To harmonize it with the DPI measure, we reduce CPG to a
three-level indicator. A government is classied as right-leaning if CPG yields the value
of one or two, center or coalition if CPG yields the value of three, and left-leaning if CPG
yields the value of four or ve. In Table 9, where we restrict the sample to countries
with majoritarian electoral systems, we merge center and left-leaning. This is the natural
choice since it implies that all countries have an alternation in power of right- and left-
leaning governments. This yields: Australia (labor (1) / liberal (0)), Canada (liberal (1) /
conservative (0)), France (socialist (1) / right (0), according to the prime minister), United
Kingdom (labour (1) / conservative (0)), United States (democratic (1) / republican (0)).
Table A.1 HERE
41The CPG index does not classify the U.S., but as we are only exploiting within-country variation in the
panel regressions, we follow the classication of DPI and code U.S. Democratic governments as left-leaning,
and U.S. Republican governments as right-leaning.
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A.3 Proofs
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The governments objective can be written as:
hB (b; ) ; T (b; )i = arg max
b0;
[1 + !(  1)] log (b0  Rb+ H ())
+ (1  !) (1 + ) log (A ())
+ (1  !) E [log (G(b0; 0)) j] ;
where we have substituted for g using the governments budget constraint. Given Equation
(8), G (b; ) is then determined by the functions B (b; ) and T (b; ) : Note, that we have
also used that g0 = G(b0; 0). The rst-order condition with respect to  yields:
0 =
[1 + !(  1)]
G(b; )
[H(T (b; )) + T (b; )H1(T (b; ))] + (1  !)(1 + )A1(T (b; ))
A(T (b; ))
;
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Since
A1() =  (1 + )(1  ) =  (1 + )H();
we can divide both sides of the rst-order condition by the labor supply H() so as to
obtain Equation (9).
The rst-order condition with respect to b0 yields:
0 =
[1 + !(  1)]
G(b; )
+ (1  !) E

G1(B(b; ); 
0)
G(B(b; ; r); 0)
j 

;
which corresponds, after some standard algebra, to the generalized Euler equation, (10).
This concludes the proof.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that  = 0. We guess that the policy function for government expenditures has the
form:
G(b; ) = ()R(b  b):
Plugging this guess into Equation (9) yields the tax function:
T (b; ) = 1  (1  !)(1 + )
[1 + !(  1)] ()R(
b  b):
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The government budget constraint in Equation (8) then yields:
B(b; ) = ()R(b  b) +Rb  1 + (1  !)(1 + )
[1 + !(  1)] ()R(
b  b):
As b = 1=(R  1), we can rewrite the above expression as:
B(b; ) = b+

1 +
(1  !)(1 + )
[1 + !(  1)] 

()  1

R(b  b):
According to the guess for the function G, the partial derivative is G1(b0; 
0) = (0)R and
future expenditures read g0 = G(B(b; ); 0) = (0)R
 
b B(b; ). Using the generalized
Euler equation in (10), we can derive an implied expression for the optimal provision of
public goods ~G (b; ),
1
~G (b; )
=   (1  !)
1 + !(  1)E
"
 (0)R
(0)R
 
b B(b; ) j 
#
=
(1  !)
1 + !(  1)
1
b B(b; ) ;
where we use the fact that the term (0) cancels inside the expectation operator. This
implies that the equilibrium function ~G (b; ) can be expressed as:
~G (b; ) =
1 + !(  1)
(1  !)
 
b B(b; )
=  1 + !(  1)
(1  !)

1 +
(1  !)(1 + )
[1 + !(  1)] 

()  1

R(b  b);
which conrms the original guess, ~G (b; ) = G (b; ) = ()R(b  b). The term () can be
determined by equating coe¢ cients as follows:
()R =  1 + !(  1)
(1  !)

1 +
(1  !)(1 + )
[1 + !(  1)] 

()  1

R
)
() =

1 +
(1  !) [(1 + ) + ]
[1 + !(  1)] 
 1
:
The equilibrium policy functions are therefore given by:
B(b; ) = b  (1  !)
1 + !(  1)R()(
b  b)
G(b; ) = R()(b  b)
T (b; ) = 1  (1  !)(1 + )
1 + !(  1) R()(
b  b);
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which are equivalent to the policy functions reported in Proposition 2.
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3
When  = 0, the equilibrium law of motion of debt is given by Equation (11). Because
of the linear of debt accumulation, the average debt tomorrow, across the set of countries
with a common i today, depends only on their cross-sectional average debt today:
Et [B (b; ; R) ji] = b  ~ (i)R
 
b  Et [bji]

;
where
~ (i)  (1  !)
1 + !(  1) (i) :
Let ij denote the probability of transiting from state i to state j in any period, 8i; j 2
fl; rg. Moreover, let j be the unconditional stationary probability for a country to be of
type j. Then, tomorrows average debt conditional on j is a weighted sum of tomorrows
average debt conditional on the realization of todays i, where the weights are given by
the exogenous transition probabilities:
Et+1 [bjj] =
X
i=fl;rg
iji
j
Et [B (b; ; R) ji]
= b 
X
i=fl;rg
iji
j
~(i)R
 
b  Et [bji]

:
We guess that there exists a quasi-stationary equilibrium such that the cross-sectional
average debt level conditional on j, denoted by bj = Et+1 [bjj] = Et [bjj], is time-
invariant for all j (this guess will be veried below). Then, since the conditional average
debt is time-invariant according to condition (3) of Denition 2, the following equation
must hold true:42
R 1
 
b  bj

=
X
i=fl;rg
iji
j
~(i)
 
b  bi

; 8j 2 fl; rg: (16)
Equation (16) can be written in matrix form as:
42Note that if the types are persistent, jj = 1; either (or both) of the following must be true: (i)
(j) = 1; (ii) bJ = b: This is the determinstic case analyzed in Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012,
Proposition 1).
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R 1v = Av;
where
A 
"
rr~ (r) lr
l
r
~ (l)
rl
r
l
~ (r) ll~ (l)
#
; v 
"
b  br
b  bl
#
:
are non-negative matrices. Note that R 1 is an eigenvalue of A with the associated eigen-
vector v. Assuming that all entries of matrix A are strictly positive, we can now invoke
the Perron-Frobenius theorem in linear algebra (see Meyer (2000), and references therein)
to establish that (i) there exists one and only one eigenvalue of A associated with a strictly
positive eigenvector v, (ii) this is the largest eigenvalue. In particular, our solution is the
smallest root of R, since the eigenvalue is R 1:
Let the transition probabilities be symmetric across states, ii = jj =  2 (1=2; 1).
Because of the symmetric transition probability across states, the unconditional stationary
probabilities will be i = 1=2 for both realizations of . This implies that the stationary
equilibrium condition in Equation (16) can be written as:
 
b  bl

=R = ~(l)
 
b  bl

+ (1  )~(r)
 
b  br
 
b  br

=R = (1  )~(l)
 
b  bl

+ ~(r)
 
b  br

:
Rearranging this system of equations yields:
~(r)R
 =
1  ~ (l)R
+ (1  2)  (l)R (17)
b  bl =
1  ~ (r)R
(1  ) ~ (l)R
 
b  br

: (18)
Equation (17) pins down the two roots for the world interest rate R and Equation (18)
shows that only the root associated with ~(r)R < 1 is consistent with a quasi-stationary
equilibrium (yields positive conditional mean debt levels, b  bi ).
Lemma 1 Suppose  2 (1=2; 1). Then, Equation (17) has two real positive roots. One and
only one root is consistent with ~ (r)R < 1; and hence with both bl < b and b

r <
b: This
root is given by:
R =
(~(l) + ~(r)) 
p
2(~(l) + ~(r))2   4(2  1)~(l)~(r)
2(2  1)~(l)~(r) : (19)
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Proof: Equation (17) can be reformulated in the quadratic form:
0 = (1  2)~(l)~(r) (R)2 + (~(l) + ~(r))R   1;
yielding the two roots:
R =
(~(l) + ~(r))
p
2(~(l) + ~(r))2   4(2  1)~(l)~(r)
2(2  1)~(l)~(r) :
The two roots are positive and real if and only if:
2(~(l) + ~(r))
2   4(2  1)~(l)~(r)  0: (20)
Note that:
4(2  1)~(r)2 (1  )
2
2
= min
~(l)
2(~(l) + ~(r))
2   4(2  1)~(l)~(r) > 0:
Thus, for any given ~(r), ~(l), and  2 (1=2; 1) the condition stated in Equation (20) is
satised. Finally, according to the Perron-Frobenius theorem, only the smallest positive
and real root for R will satisfy bl < b and b

r <
b. 
This establishes the existence of a linear QSMPE, as stated in Proposition 3. Finally,
applying LHopitals rule in Equation (19) establishes that:
lim
!1=2
R =
1 + !(  1)
(1  !)
2
(l) + (r)
:
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
TABLE A.2 HERE
60
T
ab
le
A
.1
:
S
am
p
le
co
ve
ra
ge
p
an
el
re
gr
es
si
on
:
d
eb
t
ac
cu
m
u
la
ti
on
A
U
S
A
U
T
B
E
L
C
A
N
C
H
E
D
E
U
D
N
K
E
S
P
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
55
-2
00
7
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
78
-2
01
0
F
IN
F
R
A
G
B
R
G
R
C
H
U
N
IR
L
IS
L
IT
A
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
92
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
61
-2
00
7
19
59
-2
01
0
J
P
N
N
L
D
N
O
R
N
Z
L
P
O
L
P
R
T
S
W
E
U
S
A
19
55
-2
00
9
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
92
-2
00
9
19
77
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
19
56
-2
01
0
61
T
ab
le
A
.2
:
P
an
el
re
gr
es
si
on
fo
r
th
e
O
E
C
D
:
E
ff
ec
ti
ve
ta
x
ra
te
D
ep
.
V
ar
ia
b
le
E
ff
ec
ti
v e
ta
x
ra
te
,
τ t
S
am
p
le
F
u
ll
M
a
jo
ri
ta
ri
an
el
ec
to
ra
l
sy
st
em
T
ot
al
go
ve
rn
m
en
t,
19
65
-2
01
0
T
ot
al
go
ve
rn
m
en
t,
19
65
-2
01
0
C
en
tr
al
go
ve
rn
m
en
t,
19
73
-2
01
0
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
le
ft
t
.2
33
.1
96
.1
32
.2
28
**
.3
59
**
*
.3
89
**
*
.1
98
**
*
.1
42
*
.0
95
(1
.3
3)
(1
.1
5)
(.
75
)
(2
.0
6)
(3
.2
2)
(3
.3
6)
(2
.6
7)
(1
.8
5)
(1
.1
6)
ce
n
te
r t
.3
14
.4
37
*
.4
03
*
(1
.3
4)
(1
.9
3)
(1
.7
8)
b t
.0
60
**
*
.0
52
**
*
.0
52
**
*
.0
43
**
*
.0
43
**
*
.0
42
**
*
-.
05
7*
**
-.
05
4*
**
-.
05
4*
**
(1
2.
68
)
(1
1.
18
)
(1
1.
07
)
(4
.6
8)
(5
.3
7)
(5
.1
8)
(-
8.
69
)
(-
6.
40
)
(-
6.
49
)
u
t−
1
.0
93
**
.0
92
**
.5
27
**
*
.5
28
**
*
-.
10
4
-.
10
5
(2
.4
8)
(2
.4
6)
(6
.9
5)
(7
.0
3)
(-
1.
62
)
(-
1.
64
)
R
ec
t
-2
.5
99
**
*
-3
.8
19
**
*
-1
.2
31
(-
3.
34
)
(-
4.
01
)
(-
1.
61
)
R
ec
t
×
le
ft
t
.7
45
-.
43
5
.6
28
**
(1
.3
2)
(-
1.
12
)
(2
.2
9)
C
on
tr
ol
s
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
10
02
99
3
99
3
23
0
23
0
23
0
19
0
19
0
19
0
A
d
j.
R
2
0.
91
6
0.
91
8
0.
91
8
0.
92
0
0.
93
7
0.
93
7
0.
96
6
0.
96
6
0.
96
7
N
ot
e:
A
U
S
,
C
A
N
,
F
R
A
,
G
B
R
,
an
d
U
S
A
ar
e
cl
as
si
fi
ed
as
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
w
it
h
m
a
jo
ri
ta
ri
an
el
ec
to
ra
l
sy
st
em
s,
fo
ll
ow
in
g
P
er
ss
o
n
a
n
d
T
a
b
el
li
n
i
(1
99
9)
.
C
ou
n
tr
y
an
d
ye
ar
d
u
m
m
ie
s
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
to
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
co
u
n
tr
y
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
.
τ t
is
to
ta
l
ta
x
re
ve
n
u
e
a
s
a
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
o
u
tp
u
t
re
p
or
te
d
in
O
E
C
D
(2
01
4b
),
b t
is
th
e
ye
ar
t
d
eb
t-
ou
tp
u
t
ra
ti
o
re
p
or
te
d
in
R
ei
n
h
ar
t
an
d
R
o
g
o
ff
(2
0
1
0
).
le
ft
t
st
a
n
d
s
fo
r
a
le
ft
-l
ea
n
in
g
a
n
d
ce
n
te
r t
fo
r
a
ce
n
te
r
or
co
al
it
io
n
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
in
offi
ce
at
th
e
en
d
of
ye
ar
t.
u
t
is
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
(d
em
ea
n
ed
),
a
n
d
R
ec
t
in
d
ic
at
es
fi
sc
al
ye
ar
s
aff
ec
te
d
b
y
th
e
gr
ea
t
re
ce
ss
io
n
.
C
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
th
e
fr
ac
ti
on
o
f
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
ed
ov
er
6
5
a
n
d
b
el
ow
1
5
.
R
o
b
u
st
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
ar
en
th
es
is
.
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
is
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
62
